The early morning phonecall: remittances from a refugee diaspora perspective by Lindley, Anna
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Centre on Migration, Policy and Society  
 
Working Paper No. 47,  
University of Oxford, 2007  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The early morning phonecall: 
Remittances from a refugee  
diaspora perspective 
 
Anna Lindley 
 
WP-07-47 
 
 
 
 
COMPAS does not have a centre view and does not aim to present one. The views expressed in this 
document are only those of its independent author.
 1
The early morning phonecall: 
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Abstract 
 
Remittances are an important strand in the relationship between 
migration and social change in migrants’ countries of origin and there is 
increasing interest in the role of remittances in conflict and post-conflict 
countries. Yet little is known about remittances from the diaspora 
perspective, and much less about refugees remitting. This paper makes 
three contributions, based on analysis of survey and ethnographic 
evidence on the remittance experiences of Somali refugees in London. 
First, it argues that the diaspora perspective is critical element in 
understanding remittance processes, and that remitting can have 
substantial social and economic repercussions for migrants. Second, it 
argues that just as migrants are not ‘just labour’, remittances are not ‘just 
money’, pointing to the importance of analysing the social texture of the 
remittance process. Third, it argues that the nature of forced migration 
may shape remitting in various ways which merit further exploration. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Remittances – the money that migrants send home – are an important 
strand in the relationship between migration and social change in 
migrants’ countries of origin.i In recent years, these flows have attracted 
considerable attention from researchers and policy-makers. There is now 
also interest in the role of remittances in conflict and post-conflict 
countries, where there is often considerable emigration and where 
arguably remittances can play a particularly crucial role in economic 
welfare. Yet little is known about remittances from the diaspora 
perspective, and much less about refugees remitting. 
 
The Somali case is a key one. The civil war provoked massive emigration 
within the region and further afield and there is a thriving remittance 
economy. This paper follows this money back to the pockets of Somali 
immigrants and citizens in the UK, based on ethnographic and survey 
research conducted in London in 2004-2005. 
 
The paper considers two questions. First, what are the dynamics of 
remitting among Somali Londoners – what can we say about the volume 
and regularity of remittances, and the actors and relationships involved? 
Second, what are the repercussions of remitting on the senders? After 
discussing relevant concepts and existing evidence, the Somali context 
and the research approach are outlined. Then the two research questions 
are addressed in turn. The paper emphasises the costs of remitting for 
migrants, the rich social texture to the remittance process, and possible 
implications of the nature of migration for remitting.  
 
 
REMITTANCES VIEWED FROM THE DIASPORA 
 
Against the background of prevalent understandings of remitting, this 
paper has three objectives. Migration is generally viewed as an economic 
strategy, and remittances are seen in this context. The dominant micro-
economic model of remittance behaviour, the ‘new economics of labour 
migration’ (NELM), conceptualizes migration as a way to diversify 
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household income sources in response to local constraints (Taylor 1999). 
In this model, the household acts as if it has a preconceived notion of 
what its members will gain from migration, and remittances are central to 
this. Remitting is part of an implicit contract between migrants and their 
family: migrants remit because of altruism, self-interest, mutual insurance 
motives, or loan repayment obligations (Stark and Lucas 1998). 
Considerable attention has been paid to the impact of remittances on 
poverty, inequality and economic growth and to developing policy 
frameworks that aim to maximise their beneficial effects (World Bank 
2006) 
 
The first objective of this paper is to refocus attention on migrants as key 
actors in this remittance process. In concentrating on the effects on 
countries of origin, remittance studies have tended to neglect the 
diaspora. For example, Caces et al. (1985) characterised migrants as 
satellites or ‘shadow households’. Recognition that migrants’ 
characteristics and interaction with the host country environment may 
influence remitting led to some analysis based on migrant surveys (Brown 
and Poirine 2005; DeSipio 2000; Marcelli and Lowell 2005; Menjívar  et al. 
1998; Posel 2001; Taylor 2000). But evidence outside the US/Latin 
America corridor, for example in the UK, remains limited (Datta et al. 
2006; ICM 2006). Similarly, the effects of remitting on senders have been 
largely overlooked. There is research and policy interest in whether 
transnationalism hinders migrants’ structural and socio-cultural integration 
in the host country, but few have tested this in relation to remittances (an 
example is Marcelli and Lowell 2005). Despite anecdotal evidence of 
migrants working long hours in several jobs to send money, the 
repercussions of remitting for migrants remain under-researched. This 
paper addresses these gaps by exploring the diaspora perspective on 
remittances. 
 
The second objective is to incorporate analysis of the social texture as well 
as the economic dimensions of remittances. Existing remittance research 
tends to focus on the latter. Patchy evidence on the social aspects of 
remitting has emerged in studies of ‘transnational communities’, but these 
tend to foreground social, cultural and political connections rather than 
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economic connections. Much may be gained from exploring in a more 
direct and systematic way the social as well as economic micro-dynamics 
and effects of remittances. It is well-established that ‘If friends make gifts, 
gifts make friends… the material flow underwrites social relations,’ 
(Sahlins 2004: 186-7). Thus, in line with more anthropological and 
sociological approaches, this paper explores both economic transactions 
and ‘the quality of relationships which these transactions create, express, 
sustain, and modify’ (Firth 1967: 4). 
 
The third objective is to consider the remittances of a specific group of 
international migrants: refugees. Refugees are often treated as an 
exception in studies of international migration, although their motivations 
and experiences can partly overlap with other migrants (Koser 2007; Van 
Hear 1998). Remitting is one such experience. In recent years, it is 
increasingly acknowledged that refugees are not just political victims and 
aid recipients but also economic actors (Jacobsen 2005). Yet still there is 
little research on their remittances (relevant work includes Al-Ali et al. 
2001a; Hammond 2007; Horst 2004; Riak Akuei 2005). Refugees’ 
remittances may bear interesting similarities to and differences from that 
of labour migrants. Thus, this paper explores how being refugees shapes 
the remittances of Somali Londoners. 
 
 
SOMALI CONTEXT AND RESEARCH APPROACH 
 
The outbreak of civil war in north in the late 1980s, and the subsequent 
collapse of the state in 1991 provoked large-scale emigration from 
Somaliaii to neighbouring countries and further afield. With a population of 
around 6.4 million, at least one million people now live abroad (UNDP 
2001). Remitting is widespread: there is vibrant and competitive money 
transfer sector. Remittances are clearly a significant financial flow, 
reaching people in wrecked cities, refugee camps and remote rural areas.iii
 
London has one of the largest groups of Somali people outside Africa and 
is one of the main sources of remittances (Omer 2002). When the war 
broke out in 1988, there was already a small community in the UK of 
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northern Somalis, former Merchant Navy seamen and their families, and 
so many northerners came to join their relatives. After the state collapsed, 
people arrived from other Somali regions. Some came directly; others 
initially went to refugee camps, cities in neighbouring countries, or the 
Middle East, but their illegal status or situation as prima facie refugees, 
and lack of economic and education opportunities pushed them onwards. 
Some people ‘ended up’ in the UK as a result of a smuggling process in 
which exercised little control. Rising obstacles to claiming asylum in the 
UK during the 1990s made it difficult to reach the UK without using illegal 
means, but many Somalis were subsequently recognised as refugees and 
became British citizens. Others have temporary status, an unknown 
number are failed asylum-seekers, and there is some secondary migration 
of citizens of other EU countries.  
 
It seems likely that there are well over 60,000 people born in Somalia in 
the UK,iv mostly in London, and the ethnic population, including British-
born children, must be much larger. People are employed in diverse 
industries, notably wholesale and retail trade, real estate, and health and 
social work.v Common business activities are money transfer, internet/call 
centres and taxis. However, in 2001 only around 16% of Somali-born 
people in London of working age were officially employed – the lowest 
rate of all foreign-born groups (GLA 2005). Labour market barriers include 
language skills; immigration status; racism and discrimination; poor 
literacy; and problems with converting professional qualifications gained 
elsewhere. Various social issues have also been documented (see Cole 
and Robinson 2003; El-Solh 1991; Griffiths 2002; Harris 2004; Hopkins 
2006; Summerfield 1993; Warfa et al. 2005). 
 
The research on which this paper is based was conducted in London 
during 2004 and 2005 as part of a multi-sited project which also involved 
research in the Horn of Africa. In contrast to most remittance studies, 
which tend to rely on macro-economic or household survey data, and to 
transnational studies, which tend to rely on more qualitative data, this 
paper is based on a combination of data sources. First, twelve in-depth 
semi-structured interviews provided some detailed examples of remittance 
experiences. Contacted through personal acquaintances and community 
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workers, the women and men interviewed were of varying ages, 
occupations, immigration status and clans, and had all arrived in the UK 
since the late 1980s. Note that in citing interviews, names and some other 
details were changed to preserve interviewees’ anonymity. 
 
Second, a survey of remitters collected data on socio-economic situation, 
family, and remittances. While Somalis abroad sometimes send money 
through traders or friends, most people in the UK use Somali money 
transfer operators. One of these companies is Dahabshiil, which has 
extensive coverage in the Horn of Africa and a broad customer base in the 
UK. The company allowed the researcher to survey people sending 
remittances in one of its London offices.vi A total of 175 respondents were 
randomly sampled (17 per cent of the customers at the outlet during the 
month in question). Short face-to-face interviews were conducted by the 
researcher and a Somali-speaking assistant, half in English and half in 
Somali.vii Although clearly not representative of the Somali migrant or 
remitter population of London, the sample provides a good cross-section 
of people sending money from a particular location, painting a broadly 
indicative picture of remittance patterns. 
 
In addition, the paper draws on Home Office and Census data; time spent 
at community-based organisations, social events and family homes; and 
consultations with people working in legal and support capacities with 
refugees and asylum-seekers (including Somali community workers). 
 
 
REMITTANCE DYNAMICS 
 
It is not known what proportion of Somali people in the UK send 
remittances.viii Many people claimed expansively that ‘Everyone sends 
money’. But of course, some people cannot spare the cash, have no close 
relative in need, or do not choose to send. However, most people who 
were asked during the course of the research said they had remitted some 
money in the previous year – even if only an ad-hoc, small amount. This 
section explores the micro-dynamics of these remittances: the patterns, 
actors involved and their relationships and explanations of remitting. 
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 Farhiya’s account 
 
Farhiyaix lives with her husband and three young children in London. She 
moved to the UK just before the war broke out and works part-time for 
the NHS. Her husband also works. Both have siblings in Somalia whom 
they separately support. To keep track of her remittances, Farhiya had 
begun keeping the receipts in a Tupperware box. We sorted through them 
as we talked. In total she sent about £3,600 in a two-year period. As we 
shall see, this is not an unusual amount for Somali Londoner to remit. 
 
First, she supports the family of her oldest brother in Somalia. He is an 
elder and was once well-off, but his business collapsed during the war. 
She feels that she owes him as he played a key role in her upbringing and 
schooling. After arriving in the UK she sent money now and again, but 
then he asked her for more regular support. Initially requested on a 
temporary basis, this support somehow became a permanent 
arrangement, and for some years Farhiya sent $100 each month to her 
sister-in-law for general household needs. Her brother sometimes asks – 
directly or indirectly - for extra help. One day he asked her to send the 
money for one year in advance so they could start a small business. She 
agreed, on the basis that once the business was set up, they would 
support themselves. With difficulty, for two years Farhiya sent larger 
instalments, but as no successful business emerged, she subsequently 
went back to sending $100 each month.  
 
Second, a few years ago, Farhiya decided to send her half-brother to 
Nairobi. He was in his twenties with a bright and hard-working reputation. 
She wanted him to learn something useful – for example computers, 
Swahili or English – and was considering trying to bring him to the UK. 
She sent money for his expenses, but then found out that he was just 
chewing qaad.x She threatened to stop if he did not pull his act together, 
and said each month she would send $50 to him for rent and $50 to their 
cousin to cook his meals. He was angry that she had asked around about 
him, and went to live in a remote refugee camps where she did not know 
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anyone. He sometimes phones, but she does not send money regularly 
any more. 
 
Lastly, occasionally she helps another brother in town and her nomadic 
sisters. Another sister lives in London but has been trying to arrange for 
her children to leave: when she goes back she sometimes asks for help or 
relays others’ requests. Farhiya also remits money occasionally to 
extended family members, and contributes to qaraan (clan-based 
collections) for individuals and social projects in their home town. 
 
Patterns and actors 
 
Farhiya’s case illustrates the complexity of some remittance patterns. The 
survey results for respondents’ transfers during the last twelve months 
are shown in Table 1. As the money is transferred in US dollars, 
respondents found it easier to remember how much they had sent in 
dollars rather than pounds.xi The first and most important type were 
remittances to personal contacts in Somalia or elsewhere, which averaged 
$3,110 per year ($260 a month).xii Many people also made transfers for 
investment or community-related activities in Somalia, bringing total 
average transfers to $4,438, although amounts tended to cluster in the 
lower ranges. Some respondents explained that they send so often and to 
such a variety of people that they were likely to underestimate what they 
sent. There were various remittance patterns, and not everyone remitted 
every month: some remitted on a more ad-hoc basis for specific projects 
or urgent needs. In this sample, 61 per cent remitted to at least one 
individual on a monthly basis.xiii
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Table 1 Remittances and other transfers  
 Number of 
cases 
involved 
Minimum 
(US$) 
Maximum 
(US$) 
Mean  
(US$) 
Median 
 
Remittances to 
personal contact(s) 
171 50 22,550 3,108 2,250 
Investment transfers 
(Somali regions) 
21 19 50,000 990 0 
Community 
contributions 
(Somali regions) 
113 10 8,756 341 74 
Total transfers 
recorded 
175 50 52,400 4,438 2,493 
Source: Remitter Survey June 2005 
Note: Due to time constraints respondents were not asked about investments or 
community contributions outside Somalia. Averages calculated over whole sample. 
 
 
Who is involved? The vast majority – 92 per cent – of respondents were 
born in Somalia. Figure 1 shows that although some lived in the UK for 
decades, most left since the conflict began and were relatively recent 
immigrants. Nearly all were citizens in the UK (or other EU country), or 
had refugee or temporary status. Figure 2 shows the gender and age 
distribution of respondents. Around three fifths were men and two fifths 
women; most remitters were aged 25-44 (broadly corroborating Lindley 
2006a and 2007 and Shire 2006). 
 
 
Figure 1 Remitters’ migration: year left Somalia and year arrived 
in the UK 
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Source: Remitter Survey June 2005 
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Figure 2 Gender and age of remitters and Somali-born population 
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Source: Remitter Survey June 2005 and Census 2001. Note: Census data is for England 
and Wales as a whole.  
 
 
This shows that the profile of remitters has changed dramatically over 
time, shaped by the conflict. Before the civil war, international migration 
from Somalia was dominated by young men: first small numbers of 
seamen in the UK and more widely scattered students and professionals, 
then large numbers of in the Gulf countries in the 1970s and 1980s. The 
civil war over-rode those earlier patterns. Emigrants included old and 
young, men and women, married and unmarried. At the same time, 
opportunities to work in the Middle East decreased and opportunities to 
seek asylum, resettlement and family reunion opened up in Europe and 
North America. Thus, there was a transformation in the geography of 
remitting and a diversification – particularly, a growing feminisation – of 
participation. 
 
Economic activities varied. Figure 3 shows that 56 per cent of working age 
respondents were in work, 12 per cent were looking for work, and 14 per 
cent were occupied looking after their home and family.xiv Only a handful 
were self-employed. Jobs included public health and social services 
workers, voluntary sector workers, bus and taxi drivers, warehouse and 
factory workers and security guards. The sample fell into four crude 
household income groups. Around 30 per cent of respondents worked and 
one or more other member(s) of their household also worked. Around 20 
per cent worked but were the only member of the household to do so. 
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Around 30 per cent were not working but someone else in their household 
was. The remaining 20 per cent or so lived in households with no apparent 
source of earned income, probably relying on state benefits. 
 
Figure 3 Economic profile by working age, remitters and Somali-
born population 
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and Wales as a whole.  
 
 
To calculate the determinants of the likelihood and level of remitting, it 
would be necessary to take a random sample from the migrant population 
and analyse the characteristics of those who remit and those who do not. 
However, some useful insights were gained from comparing the remitter 
sample with Census data. In demographic terms, for example, Figure 2 
showed that remitters were more likely to be aged 25-44 than the general 
Somali-born population. In Somali communities, it is sometimes said that 
women are ‘better’ remitters than men (even that it is better to have one 
daughter abroad than ten sons). But in our sample there was a greater 
proportion of men than in the general Somali-born population. Moreover, 
male respondents sent larger remittances on average ($3,645), although 
women still sent considerable sums ($2,340). The most plausible 
explanation of the perception that women are better remitters lies in a 
relative rather than an absolute change. Men dominate as senders, but 
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women play a considerable minority role: this runs counter to traditional 
culture, as we shall see below, so is widely noted. 
 
Turning to economic characteristics, Figure 3 showed that the remitters 
surveyed had higher – by over three times - employment rates than the 
general Somali-born population. Moreover, workers sent around three 
times larger amounts than non-workers. Remitters in dual income 
households sent the most, followed by those in single income households 
where the remitter worked. This suggests, unsurprisingly, that economic 
situation affects remittances. 
 
Remittance relationships 
 
Remitting is embedded in social relationships. Several geometries may be 
identified. First, there are individual-to-individual remittances: the sender 
supporting one individual. Second, in individual-to-several remittances, 
the sender directly supports more than one individual – their ‘list’, as 
some say. Just under one quarter of the respondents regularly sent 
money to more than one person and many sent money to several people 
less frequently during the last year. Third, in several-to-individual 
remittances, the sender organises with others to co-operate in remitting 
to an individual. Other geometries involve groups overseas raising money 
for needy individuals or community purposes - while these transfers are 
not personal remittances, they are part of the wider picture. ‘Conduit 
people’ – or key family players – play an important role in all these 
geometries, keeping contact with people ‘back home’ and mobilising 
family overseas. 
 
Even in an individual-to-individual remittance, the wider social context is 
relevant: around a quarter of respondents lived alone (mainly men) but 
the rest lived with other people, usually family members – and one third 
lived with someone else who also remitted. Sometimes, on the sender’s 
side, people send money received money from someone else, for 
example, housewives sending money obtained from husbands. On the 
recipients’ side, money is often used for general household needs. 
However, who sends and receives is crucial to understanding the 
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remittance process, reflecting livelihood arrangements and family politics. 
For example, people often remit to female relatives because they are 
responsible for buying and cooking food – some fear male relatives will 
spend the money on qaad or on marrying a second wife rather than 
prioritising the existing family’s needs. 
 
Farhiya’s example showed that a variety of relationships may be animated 
by remittances. The survey collected data on 177 recipients who received 
money four or more times in the last year, the majority living in the 
Somali regions. Fifty five per cent were women and 45 per cent were 
men; just over half were aged 50 or over. The commonest recipients of 
regular remittances in this sample were mothers, followed by brothers, 
fathers, sisters and spouses, mainly wives. Thus, parent and sibling 
relationships were prominent and spousal remittance relationships were 
less common than might be expected among labour migrants: many 
Somali couples were split by death, separation and divorce, and many 
others were reunited or were married overseas. However, predictably, 
wives and children who are left behind, have a strong claim for 
assistance: the highest average personal remittances went to spouses, 
followed by fathers, mothers and brothers. 
 
In all, this evidence suggests a somewhat uneven transnationalisation of 
traditional relationships and roles. In the pre-war era, men tended to act 
as the breadwinner and women had much less of an economic role outside 
the home, but conflict and displacement pushed more women into 
economic activity outside the home both in Somalia and overseas (Cabdi 
2005). Remittance relationships reflect these changes in the country of 
origin: while some indicate traditional relationships of economic support 
(for example men supporting wives, mothers, fathers, brothers), others 
do not (women supporting fathers and brothers). Also, the mode of 
support offered may be modified by the distance, with people traditionally 
expected to give in-kind assistance or care work instead sending cash.  
 
Many Somali families are scattered across several countries, with family 
back home more of a ‘shadow’ or ‘residual’ household than the refugees. 
72 per cent had close family beyond the Horn of Africa. One might expect 
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that where there are more family overseas, individuals remit less (Gubert 
2002). However, increases in the ratio of respondents’ close family 
members overseas to those in Somalia (or Africa) did not correspond with 
decreases in remittances. Other factors may matter: for example, those 
with many family members back home may be saving to help their 
relatives leave rather than remitting. Also, people often support extended 
family members, clanspeople, and even old colleagues and school friends.  
 
Exploring explanations of remitting 
 
The survey findings provide some indications of how people act – but how 
do they explain their actions? First, many remitters emphasised that they 
are moved to send money in response to the need of recipients. People 
are constantly hearing sad stories of relatives’ trying or desperate 
situations. Many explained that it was their Islamic duty to assist their 
family and people in need. Some fear that young male relatives will join 
the militia. Telephone contact is crucial – making overseas calls from 
Somalia is relatively cheap due to thriving and competitive 
telecommunications – and early morning phonecalls are common as 
people try to catch you before you leave the house. 
 
Second, a sense of reciprocity also emerged in migrants’ explanations. 
Many felt that they owe their parents, and often older brothers or uncles 
for bringing them up, helping with their education, sometimes for paying 
for them to go overseas. However, in most cases, the sense of debt was 
rather diffuse and indefinite, resonating with the anthropological concept 
of generalised reciprocity i.e. an indefinite reciprocity involving no overt 
reckoning of debts (as distinct from balanced reciprocity i.e. returns of 
commensurate worth): ‘A good pragmatic indication of generalized 
reciprocity is a sustained one-way flow. Failure to reciprocate does not 
cause the giver of stuff to stop giving: the goods move one way, in favour 
of the have-not, for a very long period’ (Sahlins 2004: 194). While 
remitters often referred to earlier material assistance received from the 
people to whom they remit in their explanation of why they send money, 
since their migration the relationship have been very much one-way. 
Liban still rationalised his own situation – supporting four uncles regularly 
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and 12 aunts intermittently – with reference to the notion of reciprocity, 
saying ‘you eat with your brother when he has money.’ Debts to older 
relatives may be transferred to their dependents, for example repaying an 
uncle by helping a cousin to emigrate or paying his college fees. 
 
Social pressure was a third feature in remitters’ explanations. While the 
importance of (having / not losing) social standing is mentioned in some 
microeconomic studies, the cultural significance and mechanisms through 
which social standing is increased or decreased and the effects on the 
migrant are not generally covered. Particularly against the background of 
forced migration, are forms of social sanction disrupted by societal 
upheaval? Or are they more powerful because people are in greater need, 
so to fail to assist is seen as a greater wrong? In their study of Bosnian 
and Eritrean refugees, Al-Ali et al. (2001b) coined the term ‘forced 
transnationalism’ to describe the strong social pressure felt by refugees to 
maintain transnational connections. Here, the term ‘pressured 
transnationalism’ is preferred because ‘forced’ invokes threatened or 
actual violence, contrasting with the (usually) much less physically violent 
forms of social pressure applied to remitters.xv Moreover, social pressure 
can shape the transnational engagement of non-refugees also, particularly 
where large disparities exist between host and home countries (e.g. 
Mazzucato 2005). 
 
Social pressure may be applied by people back home. Many Somalis would 
be ‘shamed’ if they did not support their relatives. One respondent said he 
would be ‘struck off the family list…’ Fartun left Mogadishu in the late 
1990s after several family members were killed. His early years in the UK 
were tough: he was homeless for a period, and stopped talking to his 
relatives. Not remitting was one element in his disgrace: 
 
I was a disgraciato, my family connections were kaput... People at 
home think Fartun is in London and he is not going to help us. They 
think I am just a bad man… They think that in the UK you collect 
money in the street and send it… The image that they give me… 
Once you are not working and you are not sending money and they 
heard you are drinking… 
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 There is also pressure within the diaspora. For example, Liban, a 
community worker, was remitting to an aunt whose son worked in a shop 
in London but was not helping her. He made his cousin speak with her on 
the phone and now takes him to the cash point each month after pay day 
and then takes the money himself to the money transfer outlet. Given the 
importance of diaspora networks in many refugees’ lives – for social 
contact, financial assistance, information and help navigating life in the UK 
– adverse gossip can have real repercussions on their lives. 
 
Lastly, economic disparities were a recurrent feature in people’s 
explanations. London, a ‘global city’ in the heart of the first world, 
provides a clear contrast with the country of origin. Interviewees 
emphasised the poverty and insecurity of many Somalis in Africa. They 
commented that relatives in Africa think that people dibadaha – ‘outside’, 
or in the west – are rich, seeing incoming remittances (often substantial 
amounts by local standards) as proof. There are concrete facts: Table 2 
reveals some of the starkest disparities in a world of uneven development.  
 
Table 2 Comparison of human development indicators, UK and 
Somalia 
Indicator UK Somalia  
Life expectancy at birth 79 years 46 years 
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 6 225 
Adult literacy rate 99% 17%* 
Primary school enrolment rate 99% 14%* 
GDP per capita (PPP) $30,821 $795* 
Sources: UNDP (2006), except figures marked* from UNDP (2001). 
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Such disparities shape economic transfers: 
 
The greater the wealth gap… the greater the demonstrable 
assistance from rich to poor that is necessary just to maintain a 
degree of sociability… the inclination toward generalized exchange 
deepens where the economic gap amounts to oversupply and 
undersupply of customary requirements and, especially, of urgent 
stuff. (Sahlins 2004: 211) 
 
Relatively small amounts by UK standards can go a long way in the Somali 
regions. Even people who are pretty poor may be able to send small 
amounts that to meet relatives’ basic needs, and it can be hard to justify 
withdrawing that support. It is possible that large economic disparities 
between home and host countries may foster and prolong remitting. 
 
However, there is evidence of some mutual revaluation. On one hand, 
recipients are aware of some of the issues people face overseas (Lindley 
2006a and 2007). On the other hand, as some progress is made in 
Somaliland and elsewhere, some migrants are beginning to deconstruct 
the symbolic poverty and insecurity of their place of origin, pointing to the 
relative affluence in better-off segments of society. As one resident put it, 
some people overseas who visit or see videos of Hargeisa - capital of self-
declared Somaliland - re-evaluate their ‘congested life’ in the tower blocks 
of the cold global North, with mounting electricity and phone bills.xvi This 
can prompt return: the wish to lead a middle-class life prompts some 
families to return from Europe to Somaliland, although sometimes they 
find that to sustain that life the husband has to work abroad (Hansen 
2006, see also Al-Sharmani 2006 on remigration to Egypt).  
 
 
REMITTANCE EFFECTS 
 
What are the repercussions of remitting on the senders? This section 
discusses insights into the effects – some quantifiable, some qualitative – 
of remitting on people in London. First the economic then social effects of 
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remitting on migrants are explored. Second, strategies that migrants use 
to cope with expectations are outlined. 
 
Economic aspects: sacrifices and strategies 
 
First, poverty may be reinforced by remitting. Without data on remitters’ 
incomes,xvii it is not possible to establish the proportion remitted. 
However, it is clear that many remitters are employed in relatively low-
paid jobs and are unlikely to have large amounts of disposable income. 
According to Idil, some remitters: 
 
don’t live lives because of it basically… Most of them, people who 
were working in factories, doing manual hard work, long shifts, 
sending money, getting the lowest incomes. Their basic wage is not 
much and they send to relatives… 
 
People on low incomes often economise hard - buying cheap food and 
pooling resources with people outside their household. When this is not 
enough, they borrow money from banks and social contacts, and women 
pawn their gold. Idil explained: ‘I have taken my jewellery to the 
pawnbrokers, and lost it all… I don’t regret it, it’s only things… I don’t pay 
bills until I get the red letters because I am always sending money!’  
 
Even some people relying on state support - for example, some elderly 
seamen relying on state pensions - send small amounts now and again. 
The survey was undertaken in an inner city area with relatively high 
unemployment and around 20 per cent of remitters surveyed lived in 
households where there were no apparent sources of earned income, 
presumably relying on state allowances. The finding is surprising because 
state allowances are supposed to provide just enough money to live on.xviii 
It is a small sub-group - 35 people - in a small sample and while every 
effort was made to encourage respondents to be open about their lives, it 
is possible that some respondents in fact did have other sources of 
income. This said, the possibility that some people remit part of state 
allowances raises interesting issues. This money is the means by which 
the state ensures a minimal standard of living for its poor. Yet some poor 
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people may quietly accept material poverty below this standard in order to 
send small sums to loved ones in need overseas. As Bryceson and Vuorela 
point out, for transnational families, ‘Imagining a family means giving it a 
definition that may conflict with the nation state’s definition of legitimate 
immigrant families’ (2002: 10). 
 
Second, labour market strategies may be affected by commitments to 
relatives, which make people more willing to accept poorly paid manual 
work in unpleasant conditions and work long anti-social shifts, and 
motivate people to find work as soon as possible, when they might 
otherwise spend time training or seeking jobs more appropriate to their 
skills. The more strategic development of remitters’ human capital 
through English language and vocational training and secondary and 
higher education can be curtailed. 
 
Third, remitting can influence savings and investments. Many refugees 
arrived with very little and have not accumulated much capital. According 
to the 2001 Census, only seven per cent of the Somali-born population 
lived in housing owned outright or with a mortgage, and 1 per cent were 
self-employed.xix These were the lowest rates compared with people from 
other conflict-affected and African countries.xx Some remit most of their 
earnings, or save it to help relatives emigrate, leaving little to save or 
invest on their own behalf. Meanwhile, many people who do build up 
capital invest it in the Somali regions: 10 per cent of survey respondents 
had invested in property there in the last year. House prices vary, and 
land conflicts are common, but money goes much further than in London. 
There is a practical and symbolic value of investing at home with a view to 
potential future return. Meanwhile, it may help relatives who can occupy 
the property or live off the rent. 
 
The role of social networks in economic advancement has been explored 
in numerous studies: social networks are complex and their effects are 
sometimes ambiguous. Of particular relevance here, studies have 
explored the relative roles of strong and weak ties on economic 
advancement and the ways that social networks can constrain as well as 
help overcome constraints to accumulation (Granovetter 1983; Long 
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2001; Meagher 2005). For Somali refugees in the West, transnational 
social ties (particularly the strong ones with people in Somalia) may prove 
economically demanding and of little use in terms of economic 
advancement in the host country - although they are often linked to local 
diaspora ties that may prove economically useful.  
 
 
Social aspects: reaffirmation and tensions 
 
Remitting can be a source of familial and cultural reaffirmation. At the 
individual and family level, being able to support relatives can make a 
painful separation seem more worthwhile. Phone contact can be key, 
allowing people to stay in close contact. Return visits can nourish these 
family relationships, often after many years apart. In the wider cultural 
sense, interviewees expressed pride that Somalis support their families: 
 
If another country like Kenya has a civil war I don’t think it would 
survive… Somalia is a little bit different because they help each 
other… But in Kenya and Ethiopia... I think the culture is different… 
They don’t think this person maybe will give you something in the 
future. But in Somalia, it’s a different culture, at least one thing is 
good! 
 
Similarly, several people contrasted solidarity among Somalis with what 
they saw as a more fragmented and selfish UK family and community 
context. 
 
However, there are also tensions. First, between senders and recipients: 
some expressed an unease that money always seems to creep in as an 
issue in relationships with people back home. This echoes findings 
elsewhere: in El Salvador family members are said to measure affection in 
remittances (Santillán and Ulfe 2006). Some felt that recipients did not 
appreciate their hard work and wasted the money. Shamsa’s brother 
remits regularly to their father in Mogadishu, and she helps out now and 
again. She was rather annoyed that this enabled her father to marry a 
younger wife and start a new family: ‘My father is having plenty of 
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children and he’s not even taking a consideration… The more you make 
children, the more you are rich. And the more he is rich, the more we are 
paying the price!’ Recipients are sometimes less than honest according to 
Idil:  
 
I have an aunt who had had all the diseases in the whole wide 
world! She’s had diabetes, diarrhoea, blood pressure, cancer, heart 
and kidney problems. I wouldn’t mind if she just said I don’t have 
anything to give to my kids, she only has to say! [Once she told her 
that she was feeling really sick and was having eye problems] … I 
rang my mum in the US to say can you help her… My mum said the 
woman has called me, she is building a house and she needs the 
doors and the window! ... I have some cousins who have had six 
miscarriages. People say anything to get money.  
 
Many refugees with family connections in more stable parts of the Somali 
regions would like to return permanently, but relatively few do so because 
of the on-going political uncertainty, and the wish to avoid disrupting their 
children’s lives and schooling.xxi An additional factor impeding return can 
be that people back home depend on their remittances.  
 
A second downside is anxiety and stress (see also Hammond 2007; Horst 
2004; Riak Akuei 2005). Many people had had relatives killed or are 
worried for their safety. Some spend sleepless nights worrying how to 
scrape together their family’s biil.xxii Idil felt that some people were not 
‘living here as a person’ but get ‘blocked out’ about remitting. Refusing 
insistent or desperate requests can be painful, as Shamsa, a single 
mother with four children, explained: 
 
How many people you used to know, relatives, calling you… I would 
change every month my phone number if I could. But you can’t go 
to all those people, the children’s school, your college, the doctor, 
the Home Office... [It’s] not because I don’t want to [help]. But I 
can’t!… As a person, who I am, it is painful to me… “I need money, 
I’m hungry, even the call, I don’t know how I am going to pay for 
it, at least send me the money for my call.” It irritates me! And 
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when I sit there [gestures towards table], I can’t ignore, I can’t 
ignore, I can’t ignore… it’s like you are facing a big wave…  
Interviewer: What do you say to people?  
Sometimes I shout at them… “Do you think we are collecting the 
money from the trees?” … But they won’t understand. I told myself, 
when I left Somalia, when I fly and look down, and I said “I never 
ever want to come back here!” After one week… I wanted to go 
back… They have no minimum clue the position you are at, how 
much pressure you have… They sit there, they wake up in the 
morning and they don’t know where to rely on their breakfast. That 
is the life they are dealing with. They have never had to think about 
anything else. If they are lucky they got your phone number, so 
they call you hoping you can help. 
 
Third, remitting can be a source of tension among family members in the 
UK. Life in the UK is a jolt for many couples. Some urban women used to 
having help in the home feel the strain when they suddenly have to cope 
with looking after the children and running the home, alongside dealing 
with other matters, in an unfamiliar, sometimes hostile environment. For 
some men, immigration is an emasculating experience as they struggle to 
find work and a re-establish their traditional role as breadwinner. Where 
the wife works or receives benefits, the husband’s role in family welfare is 
reduced (Griffiths 2002). With marital relations already undergoing 
complex adjustments, remittances can impose an added strain. Where the 
wife works she is usually expected to support her relatives back home 
herself, but if she is a housewife she often wants her husband to help his 
in-laws as well as his own relatives, which can cause marital strife. In 
Minneapolis, Horst (2004) found that some young Somali-Americans put 
off marriage and starting a family because of their remittance obligations.  
 
Intergenerational tensions can also arise as children may not understand 
or resent their parents remitting to people that they have never met. 
Forty per cent of remitters lived in households with children under 16. 
Many of these children have grown up a long way from their relatives and 
may struggle to understand why their parents send money. In transational 
communities, children ‘have to construct their notion of a family and its 
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emotional and economic utility more deliberately, rather than taking it for 
granted through continuous day-to-day interaction. A family in the 
absence of regular physical proximity requires conscious rationalization’ 
(Bryceson and Vuorela 2002: 15). While Somali diaspora culture has 
shown resistance to erosion from what are seen as western and 
individualistic values, there is some ‘nuclearisation’ of families, as they 
bring up their children in London. But some parents, particularly those 
with connections in Somaliland, make a point of taking their children on 
holiday to foster language skills, cultural identity and relationships with 
relatives. As most the Somalis came to the UK in the late 1980s and 
1990s, the adult ‘second generation’ is still small, but the 1.5 generation 
(born in Somalia but left at a young age) is sizeable: according the 2001 
Census 51 per cent of people born in Somalia were under 25. Some send 
money because of a special affection or duty towards a particular relative; 
others contribute as much to relieve their parents in the UK, as to help the 
recipients. Unless ‘enforced’ by parents or other conduits, remittances 
among this group appear to take the form of occasional gifts rather than 
regular stipends, with implications for future flows. Remitting can also 
cause extended family disputes over who is responsible for whom. 
 
Coping strategies: from negotiation to avoidance 
 
These expectations clearly sometimes weigh heavily on people. While 
many simply persevere, others adopt various strategies to cope. First, 
negotiation within diaspora family networks can make remittance 
commitments more manageable: people may take turns or each 
contribute towards a combined monthly amount. The main recipient in 
Somalia may channel funds, buffering requests to the remitter.  
 
A second strategy is to keep track of how much is sent and to whom. 
While many people find that difficult, some carefully remember what they 
have sent in case they need to negotiate or deflect future requests. This is 
why Farhiya began collecting her receipts: 
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They think that I never give them enough… One day if I go there I 
will calculate how much I have sent… I will be sitting in their home… 
it will come up… Maybe they will realise: either it doesn’t work 
sending all this money or… Maybe it will help them to think… I will 
take the receipts in the box! 
 
Third, some try to keep tabs on the recipients. Many respondents discuss 
with their family members how much money they need, and send just 
enough to prevent hardship but try to avoid cultivating unnecessary 
dependency – a ‘subsistence ethic’ also identified among Latin America 
remitters (Waller Meyers 1998). The gossip machine can help migrants 
find out how money is spent and identify potential ‘worthy’ beneficiaries – 
in this way Farhiya both identified her half-brother as bright and hard-
working and subsequently discovered he was falling short of her 
expectations. However, remitters with doubts often find it hard to 
question recipients’ uses of the money, acknowledging their distance from 
the local situation and fearing an cold response. 
 
A fourth strategy is to help recipients invest in an independent future. 
Most directly, some save a lump sum to help recipients establish a small 
business (Lindley 2007).xxiii But this is not always feasible – for example, if 
you cannot save enough, or if relatives are too old or young, or live in a 
particularly insecure area. Alternatively, remitters often sponsor the 
education of young relatives (Lindley 2006b); or help relatives emigrate to 
neighbouring countries or further afield.xxiv From the remitters’ point of 
view this can turn a dependent into someone who may be able to help 
with, or even take over their remittance responsibilities. Thus, there is an 
internal momentum to the migration-remittance process. 
 
Lastly, some people avoid remitting. They may evade contact by ignoring 
early morning phone calls, avoiding giving their phone number to people 
back home, even changing phone numbers. Consistent refusals eventually 
deter callers: Osman said that as a student, ‘The word got around that I 
don’t have money, or even if I have, I don’t give… [Laughs] I built up 
quite a bad reputation in Somalia so people don’t bother to ask me for 
money!’ 
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 These effects and strategies point to the need for research on the 
sustainability of the remittance process over time. It is generally assumed 
that if the migrant does not return home, remitting will decline with time, 
as they face competing claims on their income and their social ties at 
home gradually weaken (Brown and Poirine 2005). Yet studies show that 
some groups continue to remit, particularly in response to urgent needs, 
long after they settle permanently abroad (for example, Sana and Massey 
2005). In the absence of more detailed longitudinal data, it is interesting 
to note that the survey of Somali remitters in London found that even 
some of the retired seamen who came to the UK many years ago still send 
remittances, suggesting considerable persistence. Considering the Somali 
case, further research is needed on the evolution of remitting over time in 
individual senders; the reproduction of remitting across generations; and 
the implications of changing patterns of primary and subsequent migration 
to the West. 
 
 
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 
 
The three main objectives of this paper were to explore the remittance 
process from a diaspora perspective; to analyse the social texture of 
remittances; and to explore the experiences of refugees remitting. This 
conclusion summarises the key findings and discusses their implications in 
these three areas. 
 
The paper first explored the dynamics of remitting among Somali 
Londoners. Many are make a regular and substantial contribution to their 
relatives’ income; others support people on a more ad-hoc basis. As might 
be expected, most remitters surveyed were in work, although some relied 
on alternative sources of income. Men still dominate, but participation has 
diversified and women play a significant minority role, widely noted in the 
community. Remittances are embedded in wider social relations in the UK 
and in the Somali regions and demonstrate a somewhat uneven 
transnationalisation of traditional relationships and roles, with some 
people assuming new responsibilities overseas. People explained why they 
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remit with reference to notions of need, reciprocity, social pressure and 
the stark economic disparities between host country and country of origin. 
 
The paper then discussed the repercussions of remitting on Somali 
Londoners. For some their remittances are perfectly manageable. The 
drive to remit may encourage labour market participation, particularly 
among men (although often in poorly-paid jobs with poor working 
conditions) and can encourage people to invest in the Somali regions. 
However, remitting can also reinforce poverty, limit the development of 
human capital in ways that may affect long-term economic prospects, and 
constrain the accumulation of savings and investments in the UK. On the 
social side, many people derive a strong sense of cultural and familial 
reaffirmation from remitting. But separation from loved ones combined 
with a pressing sense of responsibility can cause serious anxiety and 
stress. Remitting can also be the focus of marital and intergenerational 
strife in diaspora households. Yet this is not the end of the story – people 
develop various strategies to help them cope with expectations, ranging 
from ‘smarter remitting’ to avoidance. These strategies show that the 
effects of remitting on senders – as well as recipients – feed back into and 
modify remittance dynamics, raising questions about the evolution of the 
remittance process over time. 
 
The paper demonstrates three key points that are of more general 
relevance. First, someone pays: remitting may have substantial costs in 
the diaspora. Many people face the double difficulty of managing in low-
paid work and meeting considerable remittance commitments. Against a 
background of a wealth of analysis of the effects in migrants’ countries of 
origin, considering the diaspora perspective can deepen our understanding 
of the remittance process. For example, diaspora poverty can constrain 
investment potential: migrants may not remit to invest in sustainable 
livelihoods for family members because they simply cannot afford to, and 
may be trapped in a cycle of regularly sending small amounts over long 
periods of time.  
 
Second, just as migrants are not ‘just labour’, remittances are not ‘just 
money’. Looking beyond the routinely analysed economic dimensions of 
 27
remitting to the more neglected social texture illuminates important 
issues. For example, the importance of the emotional value of the familial 
and cultural reaffirmation involved in remitting money are hard to capture 
using survey methods, but can be a crucial part of the process. Another 
example is the analysis of the social relationships made possible by this 
approach which allowed us to see the importance of sibling relationships in 
the Somali remittance process. It also showed that many people were 
remitting to relatives whom they might traditionally expect to be their 
dependents – a point that is relevant to the wider debate on whether 
remittances foster economic dependency. Analysis of the social texture of 
remittances may encourage more qualitative approaches to data 
collection. 
 
Third, while in some respects the remittance processes of refugees and 
labour migrants may be similar, they may differ in other respects. 
Hundreds of thousands of refugees left the Somali regions not to diversify 
their income but to save their lives, yet they subsequently became 
remitters: a much more unsettled relationship between migrating and 
remitting than envisaged by NELM. On one hand, refugees may take 
longer to enter the labour market and begin to remit, and it may take a 
particular incident back home to trigger remitting. On the other hand, 
some refugees may rush into exploitative work to try to repay smugglers 
or help desperate relatives. Remittances are shaped by immigration 
regimes: the Somali conflict led to the possibility of seeking asylum in the 
West, which transformed the demography and geography of remitting. As 
asylum opportunities narrow in the UK and elsewhere, and official family 
reunion takes its course, future flows may depend more on existing 
migrants’ transnational social connections, the reproduction (or not) of 
remitting in younger people, marriage migration, and migration to other 
destinations, particularly the Middle East. Forced migration is, as Castles 
has argued, ‘a pivotal aspect of global social relations,’ (2003: 27): its 
causes, forms, evolution and the policy responses it encounters cannot be 
isolated from processes of globalization and North-South disparities. 
Likewise, the North-South divide infuses the everyday lives of refugee 
remitters in London. 
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All the issues touched on here merit more detailed exploration. It is clear 
that there are strong conceptual and empirical reasons for research to 
analyse remittances from a diaspora perspective, investigate the social 
texture of these transactions, and consider refugees’ remittances. 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
i Many thanks are due to Fatuma Abdullahi, Leah Bassel, Stephen Castles and Nicholas Van 
Hear for reading earlier versions of the paper; and to Ayan Mohamud Mohamed, 
Dahabshiil, UNDP, Horn Stars, Oxford House in Bethnal Green and Dadihiye Development 
for assisting with the research. 
ii In this paper, the term ‘Somali regions’ is used to refer to the areas within the borders of 
the Republic of Somalia, formed in 1960. The north west, a former British Protectorate, 
declared independence as Somaliland in 1991. The north east, known as Puntland, 
established a regional administration in 1998. In the southern regions the Transitional 
Federal Government is struggling for control, but is recognized by the international 
community as the government of Somalia. Research participants included people of 
different political positions and people with mixed feelings on the future of the Somali 
regions.  
iii See Lindley (2007) for more information and references. 
iv This is a conservative estimate based on cross-checking various sources: 
a) 2001 Census recorded 43,373 people living in England and Wales who were born in 
Somalia  
b) Labour Force Survey 1997 estimated a Somali-born population of 47,000 (Griffiths 
2002). 
c) Summerfield (1993) estimated a population of c. 6,000 pre-war 
d) Home Office records show 34,000 Somali nationals were granted settlement – i.e. the 
right to live and work indefinitely - in the UK in 1985-2001. 
e) In 2001-2004, 14,215 Somali nationals claimed asylum (excluding dependents) 
f) In 1985-2004, around 54,800 Somali nationals were granted settlement. Most will 
have remained in the UK.  
g) These sources do not adequately capture failed asylum-seekers, irregular migrants or 
Somali Europeans (many of the latter have arrived since 2000).  
Note that while the Census has limitations when it comes to reaching non-English speakers 
and inner city, transient and economically marginalised populations, it remains the most 
comprehensive and robust source of data on the Somali-born population and is used – 
circumspectly at times – in this study. 
v Census 2001, Table C01.16 
vi For practical reasons, 30 questionnaires were administered in a smaller office elsewhere 
in London. 
vii Forty people refused to participate, mainly giving time pressure as a reason, but there 
was no evidence that this led to the under-sampling of people with particular 
characteristics. 
viii In a survey of Black and Minority Ethnic households, over one quarter had sent 
remittances in the previous year (ICM 2006). 
ix Note that all names are pseudonyms. 
x A green leaf that is chewed in the Horn of Africa. 
xi Remitters usually say how much they want to send in US dollars, then the cashier 
calculates the cost in pounds (of buying the dollars and paying commission of around 5 per 
cent) 
xii Dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest five. Data were not collected on in-kind 
remittances, which are much less common. The $3,000 figure corroborates other 
estimates (Shire 2006; Lindley 2007). 
xiii Due to the time constraints, detailed information was collected only on remittances to 
personal contacts that the respondents considered to be ‘regular’ and the amounts and 
destination of other remittances to personal contacts. Only a handful of senders classified 
remittances sent three or fewer times in the last year as ‘regular’, while many recorded 
transfers sent four times a year as ‘regular’, so the former were reclassified as irregular in 
the data analysis. 
xiv Respondents were classified so as to compare with the Census data. 
xv Although emigrants can also be the victims of transnational crime and extortion: militia 
in central and southern Somalia sometimes kidnap relatives or returnees, demanding large 
ransoms. 
xvi I am grateful to Bobe Yusuf Du'ale for pointing this out. 
xvii It was deemed that it was too sensitive to collect information on income in the survey. 
xviii Income support for a single person over 24 years old was £56.20 per week (£2,922.40 
per year). See www.rightsnet.org.uk  
xix Compare with 71 per cent homeowning and 23 per cent self-employment for UK-born 
population.  
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xx The countries of birth compared with Somalia were: Afghanistan, Angola, Congo, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Sudan. Rwandans had the 
next lowest rate of home ownership (11%) and had only slightly higher self-employment 
rates than Somalis.  
xxi Other refugees manifest similar concerns regarding the education of children even after 
a political solution has been reached in their country - for example Eritreans  (Al-Ali et al. 
2001b). 
xxii Biil means living expenses. The term is also used for regular remittances that are 
directed towards living expenses. 
xxiii Women sometimes use hagbaad, the rotating savings system, to do this. 
xxiiii Traditionally used to describe herding or driving livestock, the Somali word kexee is 
now also used to describe this facilitation of migration. 
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